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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Eleasar Pedrosa Frakes appeals from the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion
seeking credit for time served.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In May 2017, Frakes pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.25-26,
29-31.) The Canyon County district court sentenced Frakes to five years, with two years fixed,
and placed him on probation. (R., pp.56-57.)
On September 7, 2017, the state filed a petition for probation violation, alleging Frakes
violated the terms and conditions of his probation in a variety of ways. (R., pp.65-70.) Frakes
admitted to violating his probation and the court set a disposition hearing on January 8, 2018.
(R., p.83.) After the disposition hearing was continued to January 29, 2018, Frakes failed to
appear. (R., pp.84-86.) The court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. (R., p.87.)
On July 21, 2018, Frakes was arrested for committing a new crime in Ada County, where
he stayed, incarcerated, until May 6, 2019. (R., pp.95-96.) On May 6, Frakes was sentenced in
the Ada County case and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.96.)
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, on February 3, 2020, the Ada County court
placed Frakes on probation. (See R., p.123.) That same day, the bench warrant in this case,
which had previously issued on January 29, 2019, was served on Frakes. (R., p.102.)
On February 12, 2020, the district court in this case reinstated Frakes on probation,
granting 94 days of credit for the “84 days served prior to January 29, 2018 and 10 days served
from February 3, 2020 to February 12, 2020.” (R., pp.106-07, 123.)
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Frakes subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion for credit for time served. (R., pp.109-12,
122-25.) In it, he sought additional credit for the 561 days he was incarcerated in Ada County
after the bench warrant issued, but before it was served:
It was indisputably unjust for the Ada County Sheriff to choose not to serve the
January 29, 2018 Bench Warrant issued in this matter upon Defendant once he
came into the Sheriff’s custody on July 21, 2018. Additionally, it is impossible to
argue that the Ada County Sheriff did not now about the Bench Warrant nor that
they could not have discovered the existence of the Bench Warrant. Reasonably
speaking, they could have—and should have—served the Bench Warrant in this
matter upon Defendant on July 22, 2018.
(R., p.111.)
The district court denied Frakes’s motion after concluding that it could not grant credit
for time predating the service of the bench warrant:
[F]irst of all, let me say the motion is denied. And it’s denied because I don’t
think I have the authority to give him that credit in this case because the warrant
was not, in fact, served. I can’t make the Ada County Sheriff’s Office serve the
warrant on him. You know, even if you had filed a motion right away saying, hey,
he’s not getting credit over here, I just don’t believe I have the authority to make
them do that….
So, you know, those—I try to make—within the confines where the legislature
gives me discretion and the statute or the Supreme Court gives me discretion in
the rule, I do try to consider that and make the judgment fair. But in this
particular case on this motion under [Rule] 35(c) I don’t think I have that
discretion.
(Tr., p.20, L.25 – p.22, L.11; R, p.128.)
Frakes timely appealed. (R., pp.130-33.)
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ISSUE
Frakes states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Frakes’s motion for credit for time served?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Frakes failed to show the district court erred by calculating credit for time served based on
the date the bench warrant was served, as the statute requires?
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ARGUMENT
Frakes Fails To Show The District Court Erred By Calculating Credit For Time Served Based On
The Date The Bench Warrant Was Served, As The Statute Requires
Frakes argues the district court erred by not granting him 561 days “credit for time served
for his period of incarceration when the Ada County Sheriff’s Office” did not “serve the
outstanding January 2018 warrant.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6, 8.) But Frakes, in effect, concedes
that he is not entitled to credit under the plain application of the controlling statute. He makes
his argument “mindful of the relevant statute’s requirement of service of the warrant”
(Appellant’s brief, p.6), which goes as follows:
The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a
bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served following an
arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho Code, and for any time
served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added).
The application of Section 19-2603 here is straightforward. The bench warrant was
served on February 3, 2020 (R., p.102), which means Frakes was only entitled to credit from that
date. The district court, bound by the statute, therefore correctly concluded it did not have
authority to grant credit for the 561 days prior to that, “because the warrant was not, in fact,
served.” (Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.3.) Frakes fails to show any error.
Despite the plain statutory language foreclosing his claim, Frakes contends he should still
be “entitled to credit for this time as a matter of fairness,” or as otherwise called for by the
“spirit” of the statute. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) He cites no controlling authority, however,
that has construed the statute this way. (See Appellant’s brief.) Frakes simply cites a dissent
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from State v. Barrett, 163 Idaho 449, 455, 414 P.3d 1188, 1194 (2018), which, along similar lines
as Frakes, disfavored the majority’s interpretation of Section 18-309. (“Under the majority’s
approach, the State is allowed to serve a Hold Notice Request on an incarcerated defendant,
subsequently wait for the defendant’s initial appearance on the new charges—in this case, a time
period of forty-seven days—and then serve the arrest warrant.”) The majority in Barrett, on the
other hand, concluded the district court in that case correctly calculated credit for time served
from “the date the arrest warrant was served.” Id. at 451, 454, 414 P.3d at 1190, 1193. Frakes
therefore fails to show that, under the controlling statute or under Barrett, the outcome here
would be any different.
Even if Frakes’s “matter of fairness” approach was the correct legal standard, he fails to
show it would apply here. He claims that the purported “facts of this case” justify contravening
the plain text of the statute; specifically, Frakes alleges “the only reason that [he] did not receive
credit for this time was due to [the] Ada County Sheriff’s Office[’]s ‘willful failure’ to serve the
outstanding January 2018 bench warrant.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.1, 6 (quoting R., p.124).)
But even assuming such a “willful failure” could ever justify ignoring the statute, Frakes
fails to show that is what happened here. The district court made no factual findings as to why
the warrant was not served. (See Tr., pp. 16-23.) Nothing in this record explains why the
warrant wasn’t served, much less shows the delay was intentional or knowing. (See R.) Frakes
assumes on appeal that the Ada County Sheriff’s Office “chose not to” serve the warrant, and
that it “knowingly did not serve the warrant,” but that is pure speculation. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.1, 4.) Even Frakes admitted this point below, refuting his own claim about the “indisputably
unjust” delay with a more accurate concession: “it is important to keep in mind that there may be
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some reasonable explanations for a delay in serving a Bench Warrant on a Defendant.” (R.,
p.111.)
Thus, even assuming a district court could rewrite or otherwise ignore the statute based
on a knowing or intentional delay (which the state disputes), Frakes has failed to assemble a
record on appeal showing such a delay. Under the plain language of Section 19-2603, Frakes is
not entitled to credit for time served prior to the service of the arrest warrant. The district court
properly applied the statute and denied the motion, and Frakes fails to show any error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s denial of Frakes’s
Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2021.
/s/ Kale D. Gans
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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